Lennox Hinds and Bryan Stevenson: Defenders of the Rights of Minorities and the Poor in Criminal Justice Systems in America


I never had an opportunity to meet Professor Lennox Hinds when I was a student at Rutgers University, because he was not teaching there at the time.



I was however paid what I considered a compliment by Professor Harold Rubenstein, when I took his class “Legal Philosophy” I was considering writing a paper on the Black Panther Party, I asked Professor Rubenstein what he thought of me writing a paper arguing that the Black Panther Party were victims of terrorism by agents of the United States government, and he said “You sound like Lennox Hinds.”

I remember that night clearly, because he did not have office hours on campus, so I waited after class to talk to him for a few minutes, to get his much appreciated advice. A lot of students had waited to talk to him, he was a popular professor, so I ended up walking with him in the direction of his car to squeeze in my question.

I did not know who Lennox Hinds was, but after my conversation with Professor Rubenstein, I was excited to go to the library to learn about him.  He did not give me much information on Attorney Hinds, but instead suggested that I look him up for myself. The fact that he kept saying that I should look him up for myself instead to going deeper into details about him drove me nuts!

I was so happy that Professor Rubenstein mentioned his name that night, and I was even more excited to find and read Attorney Hinds’s book “Illusions of Justice,” which was not easy to get a copy of.

After reading his book, I realized that he was everything that I always wanted to be.  He was using his life to do the things that I wanted to do, and I later wrote to him.

I also later understood why Professor Rubenstein  did not go into a lot of detail about Lennox Hinds.  When I found this document while researching information on Attorney Hinds, I was surprised to find the name of my professor, Attorney Harold Rubenstein, listed as one of the Counsel.

To be a student in his class was an amazing opportunity. He was so popular at Rutgers that I was on a waiting list to get an override to get into his class.  I learned a lot in his class, but what stands out most of his teachings is:

“An unjust law is no law at all.”  Thomas Aquinas.  I was introduced to Thomas Aquinas as a part of our discussions of Martin Luther King Jr.’s “Letter From A Birmingham Jail.”  What I am most grateful to Professor Rubenstein for is that through our conversation that night, when I asked his opinion of writing about the Black Panther Party, that he introduced me to the work of Attorney Lennox Hinds.

For me, being a student at Rutgers University was a life changing experience because I was given an opportunity to study under what I would argue are some of the most highly gifted and esteemed professors in academia in this country and maybe even the world.

Page 1
LEXSEE 90 N.J. 604
Supreme Court of New Jersey
90 N.J. 604; 449 A.2d 483; 1982 N.J. LEXIS 2184
February 9, 1982, Argued
August 4, 1982, Decided
On certification to District VIII Ethics Committee.
LexisNexis(R) Headnotes
Morton Stavis
argued the cause for respondent Lennox
S. Hinds (
Morton Stavis, Bernard K. Freamon
A. Slocum
, attorneys;
Lewis Myers, Jr.
, a member of the
Mississippi and Illinois Bars, of counsel;
Morton Stavis,
Bernard K. Freamon
Neil M. Mullin
, on the brief).
Colette A. Coolbaugh
, Assistant Director, Ethics &
Professional Services, argued the cause for complainant
District VIII Ethics Committee (
Colette A. Coolbaugh
Harold L. Rubenstein
, on the brief).
Stephen M. Latimer
submitted a brief on behalf of
amicus curiae
Public Interest Lawyers of New Jersey
Stephen M. Latimer
, attorney;
George Conk
, on the brief).
Elizabeth M. Schneider
Frank Askin
a brief on behalf of
amici curiae
The American Civil
Liberties Union of New Jersey and The Association of
Black Women Lawyers of New Jersey.
The opinion of the Court was delivered by Handler,
J. Pashman, J., concurring. Clifford, J., concurring in
result. Schreiber, J., dissenting.
[*609] [**486]
This case requires
us to
determine the constitutional scope of rules disciplining
an attorney for making out–of–court statements publicly
criticizing the trial judge’s conduct of an ongoing crim-
inal trial. Lennox Hinds, the appellant, claims that as a
matter of constitutional right under the First Amendment,
an attorney cannot be disciplined for making such state-
ments unless they present a “clear and present danger”
to the fairness of the judicial proceeding. The primary
disciplinary standard sought to be applied in this case,
however, requires discipline of an attorney if his extraju-
dicial statements are “reasonably likely” to interfere with
a criminal trial.
We now affirm the constitutionality of the “reason-
able likelihood” standard of
7–107(D) for restricting
attorney extrajudicial speech in the specific setting of a
criminal trial. We further hold that the determination of
whether a particular statement is likely to interfere with a
fair trial involves a careful balancing of factors, including
consideration of the status of the attorney, the nature and
timing of the statement, as well as the context in which
it was uttered. In addition, we hold that
applies not only to an attorney of record in a
criminal case but also to an attorney who cooperates with
the defense on a regular and continuing basis, provides
legal assistance in connection with the defense of a crim-
inal charge, and holds himself out to be a member of the
defense team.
However, because this opinion rep-
resents the first time that we have interpreted the proper
scope of
7–107(D) and the standard to be followed
in applying this disciplinary rule to extrajudicial state-
ments, we deem it appropriate to give our determination
prospective effect only. Consequently, we dismiss these
charges against Hinds, as well as related charges under
1–102(A)(5), which sanctions attorney conduct that
is “prejudicial to the administration of justice.”
We deal first with the procedural and factual back-
ground of the case. Hinds has been a member of the New
Jersey Bar since 1973. He has been active and prominent
as a lawyer in civil rights causes and has a national reputa-
tion for his work as Director of the National Conference

Page 6
90 N.J. 604, *619; 449 A.2d 483, **491;
1982 N.J. LEXIS 2184, ***22
ception. The courts must take such steps by
rule and regulation that will protect their pro-
cesses from prejudicial outside interferences.
Neither prosecutors, counsel for defense, the
accused, witnesses, court staff nor enforce-
ment officers coming under the jurisdiction
of the court should be permitted to frustrate
its function. Collaboration between counsel
and the press as to information affecting the
fairness of a criminal trial is not only sub-
ject to regulation, but is highly censurable
and worthy of disciplinary measures.
U.S. at 361–63, 86 S.Ct. at 1521–1522, 16
L.Ed.2d at 619–620
Thus, the Supreme Court targeted the evil as public speech
that creates “a reasonable likelihood . . . [of] prevent[ing]
a fair trial.”
This Court has similarly recognized that extrajudicial
speech by attorneys participating in a criminal case is not
[*620] [**492]
protected under the First
Amendment if it will have a deleterious impact upon the
fairness and integrity of the proceeding. In a strongly
worded statement in
Van Duyne
, we expressed the view
that Canon 20, the predecessor to
7–107(D), pro-
attorney extrajudicial statements that
have the capacity to interfere with a fair trial. n3 We
The right of the State to a fair trial cannot be
imperiled or diluted by [an attorney’s] out–
of–court assertions . . . to news media on the
subject of his client’s innocence. The court-
room is the place to settle the issue and com-
ments before or during the trial which have
the capacity to influence potential or actual
jurors to the possible prejudice of the State
are impermissible.
[43 N.J. at 389]
n3 Canon 20 of the old ABA Canons of
Professional Ethics provided:
Newspaper publications by a lawyer
as to pending or anticipated litigation
may interfere with a fair trial in the
courts and otherwise prejudice the due
administration of justice. Generally
they are to be condemned. If the ex-
treme circumstance of a particular case
justify a statement to the public, it
is unprofessional to make it anony-
mously. An
ex parte
reference to the
facts should not go beyond quotation
from the records and papers on file in
the court; but even in the extreme cases
it is better to avoid any
ex parte
Many courts have upheld the constitutional validity of
the “reasonable likelihood” standard for limiting lawyer
extrajudicial comments during criminal trials. See,
Hirschkop, 594 F.2d at 368–70; Tijerina, 412 F.2d at 667;
Younger v. Smith, 30 Cal.App.3d 138, 106 Cal.Rptr. 225
(1973); People v. Dupree, 88 Misc.2d 780, 388 N.Y.S.2d
203 (Sup.Ct.1976). Cf. State v. Ross, 36 Ohio App.2d 185,
304 N.E.2d 396 (Ct.App.1973),
appeal dismissed,
U.S. 904, 94 S.Ct. 1397, 39 L.Ed.2d 461 (1974)
refused to grant attorney permission to appear
pro hac
in criminal trial because the attorney said he would
only limit his public comments to those not creating a
“clear and present danger” to the proceedings);
v. Disciplinary Board
, 54
420 A.2d
41 (1980),
aff’d sub nom.
Cohen v. Disciplinary Board,
494 Pa. 129, 430 A.2d 1151 (1981),
appeal dismissed,
U.S. , 102 S.Ct. 1266, 71 L.Ed.2d 454 (1982)
sonable likelihood” standard applied in context of admin-
istrative hearing). See also
Revised Report of the Judicial
Conference Committee on the
Operation of the
Jury System on the “Free
Press —- Fair Trial”
Issue, 87 F.R.D. 519, 523–24 (1980);
Cole and Spak,
“Defense Counsel and the First Amendment: A Time to
Keep Silence, and a Time to Speak,”
6 St. Mary’s L.J. 347
Note, “Professional Ethics and Trial Publicity:
What All The Talk Is About,”
10 Suffolk L.Rev. 654
Note, “
Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer
: Gag
Rules —- The First Amendment v. The Sixth Amendment,”
30 S.W.L.J. 507 (1976).
Other courts have rejected the “reasonable likelihood”
test and have applied a traditional First Amendment anal-
ysis, holding that the Constitution protects an attorney’s
right to make extrajudicial statements, except when those
comments create a “clear and present danger” or a “se-
rious and imminent threat” to the administration of jus-
tice. See,
e.g., Bauer, 522 F.2d at 249; In re Oliver,
452 F.2d 111 (7 Cir. 1971); Chase v. Robson, 435 F.2d
1059 (7 Cir. 1970); United States v. Garcia, 456 F.Supp.
1354 (D.P.R.1978); Hamilton v. Municipal Court for
Berkeley–Albany Judicial District, 270 Cal.App.2d 797,
76 Cal.Rptr. 168, cert.
396 U.S.
985, 90
S.Ct. 479, 24 L.Ed.2d 449 (1969).
See also
Model Rules of
Professional Conduct, ABA Commission of Evaluation of
Professional Standards
at 270, 275 (Alt. Draft 1981) (rec-
ommending change in standard to proscribe only those
comments that have a “substantial likelihood of materi-
ally prejudicing” the trial, with change intended to incor-

Page 7
90 N.J. 604, *621; 449 A.2d 483, **492;
1982 N.J. LEXIS 2184, ***26
porate “clear and present danger” test);
ABA Standards
1978, supra
(recommending change to “clear and present
danger” test and suggesting constitutional invalidity of
present standard); Note, “Professional Responsibility —-
Trial Publicity —- Speech Restrictions Must Be Narrowly
54 Texas L.Rev. 1158 (1976).
In addressing the issue of prejudicial out–
of–court statements by attorneys in
, the Supreme
Court refused to endorse the clear and present danger test.
There, an attorney was suspended from the practice of law
for making an out–of–court speech in which she allegedly
maligned the judge before whom she was appearing as de-
fense counsel in a pending conspiracy case. Although five
members of the Court voted to overturn the suspension
because of insufficient evidence of professional
misconduct, four dissenting justices, joined by
concurring Justice Stewart, questioned the applicability
of the clear and present danger test to situations involv-
ing attorneys who make extrajudicial statements about
ongoing cases in which they are participating.
We are satisfied that the clear and present danger for-
mulation is not constitutionally compelled when the sub-
ject of the restriction is the extrajudicial speech of attor-
neys participating in criminal trials. The clear and present
danger test is neither more precise nor more certain in
meaning than is the reasonable likelihood test. While
the clear and present danger test may be stricter than the
reasonable likelihood standard, strictness does not import
more precision or imply greater clarity. As a test, it has
generated its own linguistic equivalents, such as “serious
and imminent threat,”
, or “substantial likelihood
of materially prejudicing the trial,”
ABA Standards 1978,
. The clear and present danger standard is no more
self–defining or self–revealing than are any of these alter-
native formulations. Thus, from the standpoint of verbal
clarity, the clear and present danger test presents as many
as the reasonable likelihood standard.
Contrary to Hinds’ assertions, the reasonable likeli-
hood standard is susceptible of objective measurement. It
is expressed in straightforward language, in terminology
that is commonly and frequently used in communications.
Younger, 30 Cal.App.3d at 163–64, 106 Cal.Rptr. at 241–
Whether a particular utterance creates a reasonable
likelihood of affecting trial fairness will depend upon the
special circumstances of each case. This inquiry involves
a careful balancing and consideration of all relevant fac-
Cf. Landmark, 435 U.S. at 842–43, 98 S.Ct. at
1543–1544, 56 L.Ed.2d at 13
(such balancing required in
a “free press” situation). These factors can include such
matters as the nature of the statement, the timing of the
statement, the extent to which the information has been
publicized, the nature of the proceeding and its vulnera-
bility to prejudicial influence, the attorney’s status in the
case, the lawyer’s unique position as an
and accurate source of information in the case, and the ef-
fect of unrestricted comment on the interest of the litigants
and the integrity of the proceeding.
n4 See Note,
“A Constitutional Assessment
of Court Rules
Restricting Lawyer Comment on Pending Litigation,”
Cornell L.Rev. 1106, 1120–21 (1980); Model Rules 1981,
at 275–76.
n4 We note that Hinds faced these charges be-
cause of his association with the
in a crimi-
nal trial. The status of an attorney as defense coun-
sel, as opposed to prosecutor, is a relevant factor
to consider in imposing speech restrictions. There
are clear differences between the two that affect
their respective abilities to influence the proceed-
ings through extrajudicial statements.
Several commentators have
suggested that criminal defense
attorneys should not be subject to
the same strict speech limitations as
prosecutors. See,
, Freedman
and Starwood, “Prior Restraints
on Freedom of Expression by
Defendants and Defense Attorneys:
Ratio Decidendi v. Obiter Dictum,”
29 Stan.L.Rev. 607 (1977);
“Silence Orders —- Preserving Political
Expression by Defendants and
Their Lawyers,” 6
Harv.Civ.Rts. —-
595, 604, 606–08
(1976); Isaacson, “Fair Trial and
Free Press: An Opportunity for
29 Stan.L.Rev. 561,
568–70 (1977);
Kaplan, “Of Babies
and Bathwater,”
29 Stan.L.Rev.
621, 625 n.13 (1977);
“Professional Ethics and Trial
Publicity: Another Constitutional
Attack on
7–107 —-
v. Snead
14 U.Rich.L.Rev.
231, 225–236 (1979).
commentators essentially reason that
the constitutional guarantee of a fair
trial belongs to the defendant alone,
not the prosecution. See
Amends. IV, V, VI. Thus, regulations
restricting free speech in this context
should be tailored to advance the
defendant’s constitutionally protected
interest in a fair trial. Moreover, they
point out that “the scales of justice

Page 9
90 N.J. 604, *625; 449 A.2d 483, **494;
1982 N.J. LEXIS 2184, ***32
new trial.
Cf. State v. Allen, 73 N.J. 132, 160–
61 (1977)
(court should attempt other protective
devices before imposing “gag” order on press).
These other options, taken singly
or together, do not preclude the impo-
sition of attorney free speech restric-
tions because, in the criminal trial set-
ting, courts have an overriding obli-
gation to “prevent . . . prejudice at its
Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 363,
86 S.Ct. at 1522, 16 L.Ed.2d at 620,
rather than to wait until after the fact
to attempt remedial action.
594 F.2d at 365.
Certain of these
measures, such as change of venue,
continuances and searching voir dire,
simply are not effective alternatives.
Moreover, ready resort to these alter-
native steps might impinge upon other
constitutional guarantees, such as the
defendant’s right to a speedy trial or
trial by jury.
594 F.2d at 366–67.
Thus, while alternative approaches to
dealing with the problem of prejudi-
cial publicity exist, they do not obvi-
ate the need for properly fashioned re-
strictions on the extrajudicial speech
of attorneys participating in criminal
[*626] [**495]
The question next presented is
whether Hinds’ remarks were reasonably likely to inter-
fere with a fair trial such that they violated the standard
7–107(D). On this ultimate question there has
been no adequate factual record developed. The Ethics
Committee never conducted a hearing on this or any other
issue. Moreover, while the federal district court devel-
oped a lengthy record in the proceedings before it, the
concern in that case was not with whether Hinds’ state-
ments created a reasonable likelihood of affecting a fair
trial, nor was there a finding to that effect. n6
n6 Although the parties apparently stipulated
that they were willing to rely on the record de-
veloped in the federal proceeding for purposes of
factfinding, Hinds now questions the effect of that
stipulation. We find that record to be insufficient for
making factual determinations in this case, which
involves very different questions from those raised
in the federal action.
Even if the record below, including
the fed-
eral court proceedings, were capable of being canvassed
for factfindings, the Ethics Committee could not have
known to resolve this issue by applying the balancing test
that we have enunciated for the first time in this opinion.
at 622–623. We reiterate that this balancing
process for determining when an attorney’s extrajudicial
remarks are reasonably likely to affect a fair trial entails
careful consideration of such factors as the status of the at-
torney, the nature and content of the statement, the timing
of the statement, and the context in which it was uttered.
The reasonable likelihood standard requires a showing by
clear and convincing evidence that an attorney’s extraju-
dicial speech truly jeopardized trial fairness, a determi-
nation that can
be reached only by thoroughly
balancing all relevant considerations.
In deciding whether a remand is necessary in this
case, we must consider not only whether Hinds’ speech
offended the reasonable likelihood standard but also the
extent to which Hinds was associated with the defense
in this criminal trial. These combined questions are im-
plicated in the application of
7–107(D), and the need
for a remand should take into account both mat-
The attorney’s status in the case is highly relevant and
may indeed be determinative on the question of whether
he has violated
7–107(D). The prohibition of
107(D) does not apply unless the speech is made by an at-
torney “associated with” the criminal trial. Hinds contends
that this aspect of the rule also suffers from constitutional
vagueness and overbreadth.
In dealing with this contention as a facial attack upon
the rule, we accept the notion that by restricting the extra-
judicial speech of attorneys,
7–107(D) was adopted
in order to “stop . . . prejudice at its inception,”
384 U.S. at 363, 86 S.Ct. at 1522, 16 L.Ed.2d at 620.
The rule seeks to prevent attorneys with a special status
the case from making disclosures that are
prejudicial to the trial process.
Attorneys of record clearly fall within the class of
lawyers who have a special connection with the case.
Such attorneys have direct responsibility for the repre-
sentation of parties and the actual conduct of a trial. They
are individuals who have confidential information and an
intimate knowledge of the
merits of the pros-
ecution. Their views are invested with particular credi-
bility and weight in light of their positions. Hence, their
statements relating to the trial are likely to be considered
knowledgeable, reliable and true.
The question remains whether an attorney who is not

Page 18
90 N.J. 604, *645; 449 A.2d 483, **505;
1982 N.J. LEXIS 2184, ***67
We shall not know whether the respondent’s conduct
was “prejudicial to the administration of justice or whether
respondent was associated with the defense and violated
7–107(D)” due to the improper aborting of this pro-
ceeding. Innovative arguments advanced in support of
the contention that a rule has not been violated may at
times be relevant in determining the
sanction to
be applied. However, they should not serve as vehicles to
evade due disciplinary proceedings. I would remand the
matter to the District VIII Ethics Committee to process
the complaint and proceed pursuant to
Fwd: Re: Terri Owens “Black Panther Party Victims of Terrorism by Agents of the United States Government”
Wednesday, August 10, 2011 9:18 PM

 Mark as Unread

“Terri M. Owens” <terri@eden.rutgers.edu>

—–Original Message—–

> Date: Thu Jun 23 23:02:23 EDT 2011
> From: lhindsshw@aol.com
> Subject: Re: Terri Owens “Black Panther Party Victims of Terrorism by Agents of the United States Government”
> To: “Terri M. Owens” <terri@eden.rutgers.edu>
> Dear Terri
> I am not presently in the USA but I would like to assist. Please contact me after 6/30
> Prof Hinds
> Sent via BlackBerry by AT&T
> —–Original Message—–
> From: “Terri M. Owens” <terri@eden.rutgers.edu>
> Date: Tue, 21 Jun 2011 09:11:40
> To: Lennox Hinds<lhindsshw@aol.com>
> Subject: Terri Owens “Black Panther Party Victims of Terrorism by Agents of
>  the United States Government”
> Dear Attorney Hinds,
> I hope that you are well today.
> I am writing again to ask you to PLEASE allow me to speak with you about my book.  I respect you and would never compromise your reputation or misuse any opinions or advice your share with me in any way.
> I am asking your help as a “Black lawyer, teacher, and student of history”  who wrote that you “could no longer participate without comment in the illusions of justice, in that endless and intricate labyrinth of legal process which holds tantalizing promises of relief, but which in the practice merely validates the results of proceedings tainted with racism and politically expediency,”  and petitioned the United Nations Commission on Human Rights and the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities concerning those injustices.  I am also asking as an Alumni of Rutgers, the State University.
> One of my arguments is that the FBI’s Crime Index Report is a fabrication, as it does not report clearly and with distinction on the crimes committed against citizens by agents of the government.  Especially those that are acts of terrorism.  The FBI Crime Index Report has the ability to be compromised by the very agents gathering the statistics and reporting the crimes to the American people.  I think it is important that statistics are generated to informed citizens on the percentage of crimes committed against  citizens, by police and government officials, whose tax dollars pay the salaries of those officials.
> Another argument is against the way the word terrorist is used.  It seems to be a word attached more often to those fighting against oppressive injustices committed against them by members of their government,  while excluding from that labeling terrorist acts committed on American soil by government agents who commit acts of terrorism against citizens under the banner of protecting the country.
> I feel that it is not enough that I can research the Ludlow Colorado incident for example, and discover that a pit where women and children took shelter for protection was deliberately set on fire by National Guardsmen, and not read that the incident was an act of terrorism committed against those people by government officials, right here on American soil.
> It is not accurate reporting of our history to label actions committed by the Black Panther  Party in their fight to liberate blacks from the injustices committed against them by the American government as terrorists in nature, when the FBI, under COINTELPRO, committed blatant acts of terrorism against Panther members and their actions are not labeled acts of terrorism, but rather acts committed to protect the welfare of the United States and her citizens.
> I want my book to serve several purposes.  One of them is that I want to present my research to President Obama as a petition for the release of Ruchelle Cinque Magee who has unjustly served 47 years in prison and the release of Mumia Abu – Jamal who has been in prison for 29 years.  I also want to ask that the charges against Assata Shakur to be dropped based on evidence concerning her innocence that has been ignored.  I want to appeal to President Obama not only as the President of the United States of America, but as a Civil Rights Attorney.
> I would value your help.  Just being able to hear your opinion of my arguments would mean so much.  I am also going to try contact Angela Davis through the email address listed for her at the University of Los Angeles, Santa Cruz.  Like contacting you, writing to Ms, Davis is quite intimidating.   as I am just a scholar attempting, as many scholars before me have attempted, to use my education to effect change in the way my government represents itself to its citizens and to the world.
> Sincerely,
> Terri Owens
> Dr. Lloyd Gardner, Advisor
> Dr. Norman Markowitz, Second Reader

Anyone doing research on human rights violations will find this book a must read.   In the event the book is a difficult find, I am including in this blog the entire table of contents as a sneak preview of just how valuable the information in this book will be to researchers.  Also included in this Blog are videos interviews of Professor / Attorney Lennox Hinds.


Lennox Hinds and Angela Davis

Democracy Now!

  Assata Shakur





Associate Professor,

Department of Criminal Justice, Rutgers University

( Past National Director, National Conference Of Black Lawyers )

Published by

School of Social Work

University of Iowa



i     Forward

X     Acknowledgments

        xi     Update on Political Prisoners




I        The Legal Basis for the Petition

I        Statement of Purpose

7       Jurisdiction

17     Statement of Standing

22     The Historical Basis For the Petition

23        Oppression of Blacks In America

30         Native Americans and Manifest Destiny:

                          A Plan for Genocide

33          Mexican – Americans:

                              Victims of American Racism

36          Minorities in the Criminal Justice System



49           COINTELPRO and other Government Misconduct

49                 Introduction

53                 The Church Committee

125                Selected F.B.I. Internal Memoranda:

                       COINTELPRO Activities

163               Conclusion

165                The Wilmington Ten

205                The Charlotte Three

252                Assata Shakur

258                The Republic of New Afrika Eleven

264                The Puerto Rican Nationalists

270                 The American Indian Movement Defendants:

                        Wounded Knee and Its Aftermath

304                  David Rice and Edward Poindexter

311                   Gary Tyler

                             Section Three of the Petition:

                                     Racist Application Of

                             The Criminal Justice System

317                      George Merritt

319                      J. B. Johnson

321                      Delbert Tibbs

324                      Imani ( Johnny Harris )

328                      Prison Conditions

346                      Attica:  Mirror of American Prisons

397                      Behavior Controls: the U. S. Penitentiary at Marion, Illinois

402                       The “Olympic” Prison

                              SECTION FOUR OF THE PETITION:

                               APPEAL TO THE UNITED NATIONS

404                       Violations of International Covenants

428                       Petition Summary and Prayer for Relief

433                       Bibliography



Bryan Stevenson

“Just Mercy”

Bryan Stevenson

“Not Since Attucus Finch has a fearless and committed lawyer made such a difference in the American South, Through larger than life, Atticus exists only in fiction.  Bryan Stevenson, however, is very much alive and doing God’s work fighting for the poor, the oppressed, the voiceless, the vunerable, the outcast, and those with no hope. Just Mercy is his inspiring and powerfu; story.”  ————John Grisham

Bryan Stevenson

Bill moyers

Bryan Stevenson on the True Costs of Mass Incarceration

“The Atlantic”







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